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Abstract
In recent years, many urban areas have established healthcare coalitions composed of autonomous
(and often competing) hospitals, with the goal of improving emergency preparedness and response. We
study the role of such coalitions in the specific context of response to multiple-casualty incidents in an
urban setting, where on-scene responders must determine how to send casualties to medical facilities. A
key function in incident response is multi-agency coordination. When this coordination is provided by a
healthcare coalition, responders can use richer information about hospital capacities to decide where to
send casualties. Using bed availability data from an urban area and a suburban area in the United States,
we analyze the response capability of healthcare infrastructures under different levels of coordination,
and we develop a stress test to identify areas of weakness. We find that improved coordination efforts
should focus on decision support using information about inpatient resources, especially in urban areas
with high inter-hospital variability in resource availability. We also find that coordination has the largest
benefit in small incidents. This benefit is a new value proposition for healthcare coalitions, which were
originally formed to improve preparedness for large disasters.
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1 Introduction
Urban areas present specific challenges and opportunities in responding to incidents where multiple persons
need medical attention. Dense population leads to larger and more frequent incidents, and urban hospitals
tend to be busier, leaving less slack capacity for incident response. On the other hand, cities tend to have
many providers with a high level of skill and specialized resources. The presence of multiple public, private,
and nonprofit entities providing rescue, transportation, and healthcare services leads to a major challenge in
emergency preparedness: how to coordinate autonomous entities during a response.
In this article, we define an urban multiple casualty incident (UMCI) to be an incident with two or
more persons needing medical attention, and multiple care resources involved in the response. The salient
feature of a UMCI is not the absolute number of casualties, but the fact that multiple autonomous entities
must work together to place them with an appropriate care resource. In our discussions with emergency
medicine professionals, we learned that UMCIs are a weekly or even daily occurrence in urban areas, and
that hospitals, which are a key resource in responding to UMCIs, are not commonly part of the decision-
making structure during a response.
In the US, the federal government is the largest payer for healthcare services (Schoenbaum et al., 2003),
even though most services are provided privately. This system structure means autonomous healthcare enti-
ties, such as hospitals, do not necessarily have direct incentives to improve community response to incidents.
With this problem in mind, in the last decade, many communities have established healthcare coalitions with
the aim of improving emergency preparedness and response. A healthcare coalition (HCC) is a “group of
individual healthcare organizations in a specified geographic area that agree to work together to maximize
surge capacity and capability during medical and public health emergencies by facilitating information shar-
ing, mutual aid, and response coordination” (Barbera and Macintyre, 2007). Each coalition’s structure and
governance are determined by the members. Much of the initial funding for HCCs was provided by gov-
ernment grants, but the business models of HCCs are constantly evolving to meet the unique needs of their
respective communities. Every state in the US has at least one HCC, and many robust HCCs are located in
urban areas. Broadly speaking, HCCs engage in two main activities: (i) coordination in the management of
emergency response, and (ii) training, education, and group purchasing to improve emergency preparedness.
We study the former due to the central role of operations in coordinating emergency response.
A main challenge in UMCI response is to coordinate multiple autonomous entities with the goal of
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removing patients from the scene of the incident and placing them in hospitals with sufficient capacity and
capability. The practice of coordinating multiple autonomous entities is called multi-agency coordination
(MAC), and usually focuses on first responders such as police, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS),
as well as government agencies. Hospitals traditionally are not active participants in MAC. Individually,
hospitals perceive little direct benefit by coordinating with one another (e.g., by sharing information about
bed availability). Reasons for this may include anti-trust concerns, fear of losing customers to a competitor,
concern with serving their own patient panel rather than system efficiency, and unwillingness to provide
access to proprietary data.
A recent trend in some urban areas is for HCCs to facilitate the medical MAC. This role is the key
functionality that we study. We formulate a model of healthcare infrastructure vulnerability and evaluate
it with historical bed availability data from one urban area and one suburban area. This analysis identifies
factors that lead to high vulnerability in the region studied. We demonstrate the value of sharing information
about bed availability in UMCI response, and we show that the most valuable type of information is fre-
quently about inpatient resources (such as Intensive Care Units), illustrating that commonly used casualty
distribution policies based on availability of ED beds often perform poorly.
Based on our results, we argue that HCCs would be most effective at improving incident response
if their roles include collecting and analyzing information about hospital inpatient capacity, particularly
information about inter-hospital variability and temporal variability, and tracking patients from multiple-
casualty incidents to determine where they were sent and which resources within that hospital they used.
2 Institutional Contextualization
In the spirit of OM research in Industry Studies and Public Policy, we integrated direct observation and
institutional contextualization into our analysis of the organizations involved in making emergency response
decisions (Joglekar et al., 2016). To accomplish this, we conducted a preliminary round of interviews and on-
site observations with key entities involved in incident response. On-site observations included Emergency
Departments (EDs) at major urban hospitals, management offices of healthcare coalitions, and “ride-alongs”
on an ambulance. Following these initial observations, we developed a semi-structured interview protocol
and interviewed diverse participants in emergency response management. A full list of informants and a
brief description of the interview protocol is given in Appendix A. From our semi-structured interviews, we
summarized the key players, decisions, and actions taken in response to a UMCI in temporal sequence (see
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Figure 8). In the remainder of this section, we use a specific example to further contextualize this research.
2.1 Example of UMCI response with MAC involving HCC: Garfield Park chemical spill
The following example details a chemical spill at the Garfield Park pool in Indianapolis, IN, with 71 total
casualties. By interviewing the Chief of Operations for Indianapolis EMS, we constructed a basic timeline
of the incident response and the coordinative role of MESH, which is an HCC that provides medical MAC
functionality in Indianapolis, IN. The incident occurred in June 2012 when a chlorine dispenser malfunc-
tioned and released a chlorine gas. Indianapolis 9-1-1 initially sent one ambulance and one fire truck to the
scene. The first five minutes of the response unfolded as follows. After assessing the scene, responders ini-
tiated the hazardous materials protocol, which includes decontamination, triage, and treatment with oxygen.
The EMS district lieutenant and 6 additional ambulances were dispatched to the scene. At the same time, the
highest ranking person at the scene established an incident command and notified the MESH coalition. Staff
at MESH received information about the number and severity of the casualties from on-scene responders
and immediately began gathering information from local hospitals regarding available ED beds.
During the next five minutes, the Chief of Operations began making decisions about patient transporta-
tion with the aid of hospital capacity information provided by MESH. At the same time, hospitals initiated
actions to expedite ED dispositioning (discharge, inpatient transfer, etc.). Within 10 minutes, the ten most
critical patients had been transported from the scene to local hospitals that had available capacity to receive
those patients. Because each ambulance can typically only take 2 casualties at a time, incident commanders
requested and received buses from the local transit agency to transport less-severe patients. Approximately
24 patients were taken to hospitals by bus. The scene evacuation was complete between 45 and 50 minutes
after the beginning of the response. We corroborated the events described above with three other individuals
(some of whom were also informants in the interview protocol) and with local news media reports.
2.2 Benefit of MAC involving HCC
As the Garfield Park example shows, an HCC does not play a direct role in on-site response to a UMCI, but
it may facilitate the MAC function, specifically involving hospitals in the coordination of multiple entities
during the response. Our informants told us that an HCC’s independence from the entities directly involved
in the response gives its staff the ability to evaluate the situation in a way that is not subjective based on
the potentially chaotic nature of the event, but objective based on the location, number of casualties, and
available resources. When an HCC facilitates the MAC function in a community, HCC staff routinely
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monitor radio communication, hospital status (such as diversions), and news reports, with the goal of having
an up-to-date system-wide viewpoint should a UMCI occur. When an incident occurs, the HCC provides
general information or specific decision support to on-scene responders.
Figure 1: Information flow among autonomous entities in a UMCI response.
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According to several of our informants, when hospitals do not participate in the MAC function, infor-
mation flows only from the scene to the hospitals (see Figure 1 for a schematic diagram of information
flow) once the patients are already en route, and on-scene responders must make decisions based on their
experience. All of the individuals who we interviewed about the Garfield Park incident believed that the
coordination by MESH provided substantial benefit to the response effort. Although different informants
had different definitions of success, the informants cited the fact that MESH rapidly provided information
on hospital capacities and capabilities to support decisions made by first responders. In particular, patients
left the scene quickly and were able to be treated by appropriate providers without overwhelming any of
the hospitals. At the same time, the hospitals were prepared to receive the patients because they had good
information about how many patients they should expect and their conditions.
While it is conceivable that on-site incident commanders could attempt to collect capacity information
from the hospitals themselves, in practice they have urgent patient care needs at the scene, and they typically
lack a formal communication framework for obtaining this kind of information. HCCs provide this kind of
framework: hospitals are members of an HCC and take advantage of its other services (like training and
education). The HCC staff can leverage this working relationship to enable indirect information transfer
from the hospitals to the responders, augmented by the HCC’s knowledge of the system state and experience
in disaster response. By using the HCC to provide decision support, incident command can make more
informed decisions on patient distribution. Because MESH was founded in 2008 and our informants had
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many years of experience, the informants familiar with the Indianapolis area all stated that the level of
coordination provided by MESH in the Garfield Park incident was substantially higher than the level of
coordination that was achieved prior to the establishment of MESH’s role in MAC. Still, questions remain
regarding: how to quantify the benefits of MAC; what type of information enables a maximally effective
response; and in what contexts and scenarios can HCCs be most effective in supporting MAC?
2.3 Research Objectives
From our in depth study of the institutional context of HCCs, we learned that there is an open question about
the role of MAC in HCCs. We have evidence from our interviews that (1) the MAC functionality is important
to emergency response, and (2) a specific HCC (namely, MESH) is able to facilitate the MAC functionality
well. We also learned that HCCs often have good access to real-time hospital capacity information that
could be used to facilitate MAC. However, we also learned that not all communities use an HCC to facilitate
the MAC function (which in turn means that in those communities, hospitals are not active participants in
MAC). Moreover, management lacks a way to quantify the benefits of effective coordination, which would
allow us to assess the benefit of including hospitals in the coordinative effort.
In this research, we first develop a performance measure for emergency response that can quantify
the operational benefit of multi-agency coordination in a UMCI in terms of patient access to care. Using
this performance measure, we study the effect of increasing the intensity of MAC, specifically by using
information about capacities at hospitals. We study how the community healthcare infrastructure, incident
size, exogenous demand patterns, and hospital capacities affect the performance. We show how to use our
model for several practical applications, including as decision support for hospital selection.
3 Literature Review
We now review three streams of the healthcare literature that especially inform the incident response prob-
lem: emergency response and healthcare coalitions, hospital capacity and patient flow, and EMS operations.
3.1 Emergency Response and Healthcare Coalitions
There are two especially foundational papers in the robust healthcare operations literature on pre-hosptial
and in-hospital emergency preparedness and response. Barbera and Macintyre (2007) outline a compre-
hensive framework for managing medical resources during large-scale incidents. They define six tiers of
resource management, ranging from individual healthcare assets, such as hospitals (Tier 1) to federal gov-
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ernment resources (Tier 6). The authors place HCCs in Tier 2, stating an HCC “provides a central integration
mechanism for information sharing and management coordination among healthcare assets”. Courtney et al.
(2009) review the Hospital Preparedness Program established by the U.S. Congress in 2002, which has led
to the formation of many HCCs. The authors explain that HCCs provide the foundation for effective emer-
gency response in mass casualty incidents.
As of 2013 the US had at least one HCC in each state and 496 HCCs total throughout all states and
territories (Schmitt, 2016). These HCCs vary in structure and function. Not all HCCs provide MAC func-
tionality in all kinds of emergencies, but many do undertake coordination activities. Table 1 illustrates types
of coordination that different HCCs in the US provide, and shows the heterogeneity in HCC participants and
coordination mechanisms. Given the above, there is a significant public policy opportunity for research that
can demonstrate effective ways to use coalition capabilities.
While our empirical context is US HCCs, we note that many hospital and health IT coalitions also exist
outside the US, including agencies that maintain relationships among autonomous healthcare providers. For
example, in the EU, the European Hospital and Healthcare Federation (HOPE) is a hospital association
representing local, regional and national health federations. Data collection and dissemination functionality
similar to that studied in this paper is within the purview of such organizations. The fact that the US
healthcare system is highly complex and decentralized, with individual hospitals having financial objectives
potentially disincenting them from coordination activity, suggests it should be more feasible to establish
coordination in more centralized, less complex healthcare systems.
Government regulations on information sharing are a key concern for healthcare coordination. The US
and EU have especially intensive regulatory environments. US regulations define certain data as Protected
Health Information (PHI) (Department of Health and Human Services, 2002). The EU has similar regula-
tions on Personal Data (PD) (Council of European Union, 1995). The type of data considered in this study
does not contain PHI or PD.
3.2 Hospital Capacity, Demand, and Patient Flows
One major factor in a healthcare infrastructure’s ability to accommodate a sudden influx of demand is the
slack capacity present in the system at the time of the incident. Hospital slack capacity exhibits predictable
variability by time of day and day of week, with the middle of the week being very congested, while the be-
ginning and end of the week are less congested (Harrison et al., 2005). Surgical schedule optimization helps
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Table 1: Examples of US Healthcare Coalitions with Multi-Agency Coordination Functionality
Coalition name Members Coordination structure
MESH Coalition
(Indianapolis)
35 hospitals, EMS, public safety. Director of operations and emergency management
coordinator on staff. Bed availability monitoring
and reporting.
Michigan HCCs 8 healthcare coalitions: hospitals, EMS, and
ancillary healthcare organizations.
Full-time coordinator and part-time medical
director (per region). Fixed and mobile medical
coordination centers.
Chicago Health
System Coalition for
Preparedness and
Response
38 hospitals, EMS, 120 long-term care
facilities, public health, and 5 regional health
care agencies.
Interoperable communication systems and bed
availability tracking.
Northern Virginian
HCC
16 hospitals, fire, EMS, law enforcement and
public health.
Incident notification, patient information sharing,
patient transfer coordination, distribution of patients
to hospitals.
Wisconsin HCCs Hierarchical: local, regional, and state (7
regions). Public health, healthcare
institutions, emergency management, and first
responder agencies.
Bed capacity and medical capability database,
incident monitoring and alert, information sharing,
coordination of transport, situational awareness.
Local medical coordination centers.
Missouri HCC Public health agencies and EMS. Medical incident coordination team. Information
sharing: healthcare facility status, mobile medical
asset status, statewide situational awareness.
Text-message notifications.
Wyoming HCCs 5 HCCs: hospitals, public Health, EMS,
long-term care providers, private sector
healthcare providers.
Real-time information sharing: public health and
medical information, situational awareness.
Medical surge coordination: evaluation of medical
infrastructure during incidents.
Northwest
Healthcare Response
Network (Seattle)
Healthcare organizations, state and local
public health departments, and emergency
response agencies.
Healthcare emergency coordination center.
Information sharing and coordination before,
during, and after emergency.
manage demand and balance workloads (Gallivan and Utley, 2005; Belien and Demeulemeester, 2007).
Hospitals influence supply by making capital decisions on total beds (Green, 2002; Harper and Shahani,
2002) and operational decisions on staffing (Bard and Purnomo, 2005; Green et al., 2013).
We consider the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and Medical/Surgical units (M/S) to be “downstream” re-
sources because patients flow from the ED to one of these units. Related literature considers ICU admission
control (Kim et al., 2014), load-based physician scheduling (Kazemian et al., 2014), and discharge decisions
(Berk and Moinzadeh, 1998). Shi et al. (2015) develop in-hospital flow requirements from the ED to down-
stream resources. Chow et al. (2011) and Helm and Van Oyen (2014) propose surgical scheduling policies
optimizing downstream patient flows through a network of hospital services.
We broaden this stream of literature by taking an empirical approach to study the distribution of patient
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
demand, but with the main lever being coordination and information sharing rather than direct manipulation
of hospital-controlled resources. We demonstrate the particular importance of coordinating downstream re-
sources. We also consider a multiple-casualty situation, whereas most of the literature in capacity variability
considers a single hospital during “normal” operations where patients arrive in unit increments.
3.3 Emergency Medical Services and Patient Transport
There is a rich literature on the operations of EMS. One stream of literature addresses unit response times
to calls that occur randomly over a geographical service region, including problems such as allocating EMS
units within a service region (Ingolfsson et al., 2008) and dynamically dispatching units based on availability
(McLay and Mayorga 2013). UMCI casualties are concentrated at the disaster site(s) rather than spread
geographically over a service region, so the objective of unit response time is of less concern. Since UMCIs
occur in urban areas and urban areas have multiple hospitals, we assume that the hospitals are sufficiently
close that travel distances will make a negligible impact on patient survival. Instead we focus our analysis
on the role of information regarding hospital capacities, and on the ability for patients to receive necessary
services in a resource constrained environment.
Recent work examines prioritization of patients for access to transportation resources in a disaster with a
very large number of casualties. Mills et al. (2013) and Mills (2016) develop heuristic policies and Dean and
Nair (2014) develop a mathematical program to distribute patients to hospitals. Neither approach considers
uncertainty in available resources at the hospitals or downstream patient flow. These studies consider very
large events and so use a mortality-related objective function. In contrast, UMCIs need not have a large
number of patients. We consider the type of incident that may be operationally stressful for EMS and
hospitals but for which patient volume does not substantially increase mortality.
A second stream of literature on EMS operations focuses on interactions between EMS and hospital
EDs. “Ambulance offload delay” occurs when patients must physically wait inside the ambulance due to
lack of ED capacity. Almehdawe et al. (2013, 2016) propose models where EMS patients are distributed
to minimize offload delays. Deo and Gurvich (2011) and Allon et al. (2013) study ambulance diversion,
a phenomenon where one hospital ED notifies EMS that it cannot accept additional patients, and identify
system conditions where is likely to occur. These models, while applicable to day-to-day EMS operations,
are less applicable in UMCIs. In the works cited above, patients arrive one at a time, which enables the
decision-maker to re-route ambulances or change the hospital’s diversion status, distributing the patients
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spatially across available hospitals. However, in a UMCI all patients arrive at once. Therefore, we focus on
finding immediate bed availability for the patients, and on coordination policies that improve this outcome.
4 Model Development and Experimental Design
We study relationships among incident severity, coordination intensity, slack capacity, and healthcare in-
frastructure response (see Figure 2). Incident severity (size and injury mechanism) is exogenous and not
controllable. In contrast, coordination intensity and slack capacity are potentially controllable, but with very
different cost structure: adding slack capacity is slow, expensive, and permanent, while increasing coordi-
nation intensity is relatively quick, inexpensive, and flexible. While both of these variables’ relationships
to healthcare infrastructure response have management implications, we are primarily interested in finding
cases where increasing coordination intensity can provide a significant benefit. Specifically, HCCs offer an
opportunity to increase coordination intensity without any capital expenditures on the part of hospitals.
Figure 2: Conceptual framework of healthcare infrastructure response to UMCI.
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4.1 Measuring healthcare infrastructure response
The outcome variable, healthcare infrastructure response, is the probability a patient will be delivered to a
hospital having sufficient available capacity to provide both emergency treatment and admit the patient (if
needed). This variable differs from typical EMS performance evaluation, which considers only the timeli-
ness with which patients are delivered to a hospital.
We operationalize healthcare infrastructure response by modeling a network of two hospitals with patient
flow through an upstream resource (the ED) to multiple downstream resources (specifically, the Intensive
Care Unit [ICU] and Medical/Surgical unit). When an incident occurs, responders decide how many casu-
alties to send to each hospital. The two-hospital framework matches our case study with two trauma centers
in an urban area and can be generalized to larger networks.
Once a casualty arrives at a hospital, we call her a patient, and we model her medical needs by a patient
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flow pathway (PFP), which is a set of services that must be completed for her treatment to be successful.
Based on our discussions with EMS managers and ED doctors, casualties involved in a UMCI will almost
always require treatment in the ED. In our model, all PFPs include the ED as the upstream resource. If
there are no staffed ED beds available for a patient, that patient is blocked. If the patient is not blocked
upstream, she requires further service at a specific downstream resource with some probability; otherwise,
she is deceased or discharged after ED treatment (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Diagram of patient flows in the model.
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PFPs occur according to a probability distribution that depends on the type of incident or the type of
injuries sustained but not on the number of patients. We assume this distribution is known, but which
downstream resource (if any) is required for a specific patient can only be determined after the patient enters
the ED. Based on our interviews with EMS and ED personnel, this assumption is consistent with practice.
The performance variable, patient flow pathway (PFP) completion rate, is the fraction of all casualties
whose PFP can be guaranteed to be completed. We calculate this rate by dividing the expected number
of casualties who can complete their PFP based on the available resources by the number of casualties.
To guarantee PFP completion, all services in the pathway must be available when the decision is made to
transport the casualty to the hospital. Of course, patients spend time in one resource, during which existing
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patients might be discharged from the next needed resource, creating additional capacity. The resource
availability data in our datasets is based on hospital personnel estimates of how many patients their hospital
could accept if a UMCI occurred. In estimating capacity, hospital personnel consider projected discharges
and arrivals. The only way to guarantee that a PFP can be completed is for all services to be available
initially (e.g., when a patient spends as little as a few minutes in the ED before requiring ICU treatment).
The PFP completion rate is therefore a conservative approximation of the proportion of patients who are
treated without blocking.
Mathematically, we denote the number of casualties (hereafter, incident size) by m. At the time of the
incident, hospital i ∈ {1, 2} has available capacity cji in resource j ∈ R, where R = {1, 2, . . . , r} is the set
of hospital resources for some r > 1. Without loss of generality, we use index 1 to represent the upstream
resource (ED). Therefore, D = {2, . . . , r} is the set of r − 1 downstream resources. Each capacity cji is
the realization of a random variable Cji . We will model the cases where all, some, or none of these realized
capacities are known to the decision maker. The decision is (n1, n2), where ni is the number of casualties
to send to hospital i and n1+n2 ≤ m. A given patient requires only the upstream resource with probability
0 ≤ q1 ≤ 1, or she also requires the downstream resource type j ∈ D with probability 0 ≤ qj ≤ 1, such
that
∑
j∈R qj = 1. That is, with probability q1, a patient is discharged directly from the ED, while with
probability 1− q1, she first visits the ED and then visits one of the downstream resources. The distribution
{qj , j ∈ R} varies by type of incident (see Section 5 for how we obtained these probabilities from the
National Trauma Data Bank).
We denote by Si(ni) the number of PFP completions at hospital i as a function of the number of casu-
alties transferred there. Since the total number of casualties is known, we focus on computing the expected
value of Si(ni). We do so under three regimes: no information, information on ED capacity, and information
on ED and inpatient capacity.
Lemma 1. Let B(n, p) denote a binomial random variable with n trials and success probability p. Then
for a particular hospital i (whose subscript we drop to simplify the notation),
1. the expected number of successful PFP completions conditional on upstream and downstream capac-
ity is
E
[
S(n)
∣∣Cj = cj , ∀j ∈ R] = q1n+∑
j∈D
min{cj ,n}∑
k=1
P [B(n, qj) ≥ k] , ∀n ≤ c1, (1)
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2. the expected number of successful PFP completions conditional on upstream capacity is
E
[
S(n)
∣∣C1 = c1] = q1n+∑
j∈D
n∑
k=1
P
[
Cj ≥ k]P [B(n, qj) ≥ k] , ∀n ≤ c1, (2)
3. the unconditional expected number of successful PFP completions is
E [S(n)] =
n∑
k=1
q1P [C1 ≥ k]+∑
j∈D
P
[
Cj ≥ k] (P [B(n, qj) ≥ k]P [C1 ≥ n]
+
n−1∑
c=k
P [B(c, qj) ≥ k]P
[
C1 = c
])]
. (3)
See Appendix B for the proof of Lemma 1. We use the results of Lemma 1 to compute PFP completions
in the experiment.
4.2 Factors and Levels
The experiment has three factors: incident type (size and mechanism), slack capacity, and coordination
intensity.
Incident type. Incident type has two properties, size and mechanism. We systematically vary the incident
size m from 2 to 100 casualties. We vary the incident mechanism, which indirectly varies the probabilities
qj of requiring various resources (detailed in Section 5).
Slack capacity. Slack capacity is the capacity available at each hospital in each service unit at the time of
the incident. Slack capacity varies exogenously due to randomly occurring demand for emergency services,
variability in patient length-of-stay, and scheduled procedures (i.e., elective surgeries). Some variability in
slack capacity is predictable, allowing us to examine the effect of low, moderate, and high slack capacity on
PFP completion without any data manipulation.
Coordination intensity. We vary coordination intensity along five ordinal levels.
Level 0 (no coordination). Responders must determine the number of casualties to send to each hospital
right after the disaster occurs without information on available hospital service unit capacities. We assume
responders use a naive policy of sending 50% of patients to each hospital. We calculate the expected PFP
completion rate, (E [S1(d0.5me)] + E [S2(b0.5mc)]) /m, using (3) to compute the expectation. Level 0
serves as the lower bound in our study.
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Level 1 (historical upstream information). Responders have knowledge of the historical average num-
ber of available ED beds at hospital i. This is commonly observed in practice where EMS lacks access to
recent or real-time information to support coordination, but does rely on previous experience. We assume
that responders send patients to each hospital proportional to the historical average ED beds available (EMS
experts corroborated to us that this is a common EMS practice). We calculate the expected PFP completion
rate using (3). We consider Level 1 to be the “baseline” coordination intensity.
Level 2 (real-time upstream information). Upstream capacity information is available in real time
through multi-agency coordination. Specifically, the coordinator observes realized capacity c1i and forwards
this information to responders, who can use it to help determine n1 and n2. Responders use a deterministic
policy that maps (c11, c
1
2) to (n1, n2) based only on the number of available ED beds. This policy captures
the practical situation where a coordinator lacks access to all data. In most communities, EMS responders
have little or no visibility into inpatient service unit capacities, even through an HCC. For the experiments
experiments, we assume that n1 =
⌈
c11
c11+c
1
2
m
⌉
and set n2 = m − n1. We use (2) to compute the expected
PFP completion rate
(
E
[
S1(n1)
∣∣C11 = c11]+ E [S2(n2)∣∣C12 = c12]) /m.
Level 3 (real-time upstream and downstream information). There is complete coordination between
the EMS responders and the two hospitals. The coordinator observes realized capacities c1i and c
j
i for all
j ∈ J . Responders still do not know which casualties will require which downstream resources. Instead they
use historical patient flow path probabilities to project downstream resource requirements. By leveraging
this information, the coordinator can provide decision support to suggest the number of casualties to send
to each hospital to maximize the service level. In our experiments, if m ≥ c11 + c12, we send c11 casualties to
hospital 1 and c12 casualties to hospital 2. Otherwise, we solve the following optimization problem:
max
n1,n2
E
[
S1(n1)
∣∣∣Cj1 = cj1, ∀j ∈ {1} ∪ J]+ E [S2(n2)∣∣∣Cj2 = cj2, ∀j ∈ {1} ∪ J]
s.t. n1 + n2 ≤ m
0 ≤ ni ≤ c1i i ∈ {1, 2}
n1, n2 integer.
We divide the optimal objective, computed using (1), by m to obtain the PFP completion rate. This opti-
mization is easily obtained using a line search on n1.
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Level 4 (pooled resources). All resources are pooled between the two hospitals. Theoretically this could
be achieved if patient transfers are possible (e.g., when both hospitals belong to one integrated healthcare
organization). We hasten to add that transfers between facilities with equivalent capabilities (i.e., transfers
due only to capacity limitations) are medically and operationally undesirable, and are therefore unrealistic
as a practical solution to the problem of geographically maldistributed slack capacity. We include this level
as an upper bound on the achievable service level in the healthcare network, though full coordination at this
level may be unachievable in many practical settings. We calculate the service level by pooling the two
hospitals’ capacities. For each j ∈ R, we define cj = cj1+ cj2. Thus, the pooled network behaves like a large
single hospital and we compute the PFP completion rate using (1).
4.3 Hypotheses
We now present hypotheses regarding the effect of each experimental design dimension on healthcare in-
frastructure response performance. We test these hypotheses using empirical data (see Section 5).
Incident type. Incident type has two properties: size (i.e., number of casualties) and mechanism. Re-
sponse effectiveness should be lower for larger UMCIs. Response effectiveness should also be lower with
injury mechanisms that require greater levels of inpatient resources (reflecting more serious injuries). Thus:
Hypothesis 1a. Larger incident size is negatively associated with healthcare infrastructure response.
Hypothesis 1b. Injury mechanism requiring greater use of inpatient resources is negatively associated with
healthcare infrastructure response.
Coordination intensity. The degree of information collection, sharing and use in responder decision-
making varies from low coordination intensity (very little or no information collection and sharing) to high
coordination intensity (extensive collection and sharing of high-quality, accurate, precise, granular, real-
time information by an HCC). Greater coordination intensity offers responders greater awareness of the
distribution of available bed capacity amongst community hospitals. Responders can use this information
to better inform casualty distribution, especially by avoiding overload of one hospital when another has
available capacity. We expect more effective response when there is more coordination:
Hypothesis 2. Higher coordination intensity is positively associated with healthcare infrastructure response.
Slack capacity. Healthcare infrastructures are not designed specifically for multiple casualty events. Each
autonomous entity determines its own care design and capacity, typically with little awareness or consid-
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eration of the other entities’ plans. This independent planning contributes to uneven distribution of bed
availability across the community’s hospitals. Non-stationary supply and demand (in both emergency and
elective services) further contribute to temporal variability in slack capacity. While greater absolute slack
capacity should improve the response, maldistribution of slack capacity should degrade performance (be-
cause each patient needs the correct resources to be available at her destination hospital, while resources at
other hospitals are irrelevant to her).
Hypothesis 3a. Higher slack capacity is positively associated with healthcare infrastructure response.
Hypothesis 3b. Higher inter-hospital variability in slack capacity is negatively associated with healthcare
infrastructure response.
Moderation Effects of Size and Slack Capacity Variation. We hypothesize that the (H2) positive ef-
fect of coordination intensity on response performance is diminished for larger incidents and magnified
for smaller incidents. Coordination benefits arise from better use of existing available capacity, not from
increasing capacity. When an incident is sufficiently large that there is not enough community capacity,
coordinative activity cannot help:
Hypothesis 4. The positive association between coordination intensity and healthcare infrastructure re-
sponse is weaker for larger incidents than for smaller incidents.
Greater coordination intensity enables better use of existing resources, so we expect higher inter-hospital
variation in slack capacity to amplify the (H2) positive effect of coordination intensity on response:
Hypothesis 5. The positive association between coordination intensity and healthcare infrastructure re-
sponse is stronger in the presence of higher inter-hospital variation in slack capacity than in the
presence of lower inter-hospital variation in slack capacity.
5 Data and Methodology
This study employs several separate, proprietary, archival datasets: one large national trauma database
(NTDB), daily census information from two autonomous trauma centers in the same urban area (case study
1), and daily census information from two autonomous hospitals in the same suburban area (case study 2).
5.1 National Trauma Data Bank
The American College of Surgeons (ACS) maintains a national database of ED visits at participating trauma
centers in the United States. We obtained the 2012 ACS National Trauma Data Bank (NTDB) Research
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Table 2: Emergency Department (ED) discharge disposition rates (%).
Disposition Classification Motor Vehicle Firearm General
Inpatient bed (M/S) 36 24 50
Intensive care unit (ICU) 23 16 15
Operating Room 12 32 11
Discharged 14 11 7
Deceased 2 10 0
Other 13 7 16
Total patients 110,715 17,171 174,028
Italics indicate downstream resource considered in case study. Source: NTDB (2012).
Data Set, which contains approximately 300,000 visit observations. We classified the observations in the
database using ICD-9 E-Codes, each of which denotes a specific injury. We then mapped the E-Codes
to injury mechanisms according to the method of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
(1997). We aggregated the 27 CDC mechanisms into three broad categories: (i) motor vehicle collisions,
(ii) firearm injuries, and (iii) general accidents (such as falls, cuts, or chemical poisoning). We chose these
three categories (which cover over 95% of the observations in the database) not necessarily to make specific
recommendations for these types of incidents, but rather to get varying distributions on the types of services
needed by the patients (and therefore different PFPs).
Table 2 shows the ED discharge disposition for the three trauma types described above. Although
the NTDB provides an important resource for estimating the proportion of patients requiring downstream
services, one limitation of the NTDB is that it is a convenience sample and only hospitals that choose to
participate are represented. Despite that, frequencies in Table 2 demonstrate that different types of injuries
result in widely varying requirements for downstream services, and because our two anonymous hospitals
are also trauma centers (TC), we expect that this variability is also present at these two hospitals. In the case
study, we take these probabilities as inputs to determine PFPs.
5.2 Hospital Census Data
We obtained daily bed availability data for two anonymous hospitals located in the same large urban area in
the United States (case study 1, hospitals 1A and 1B) and two anonymous hospitals in the same suburban
area in the United States (case study 2, hospitals 2A and 2B). Hospitals 1A and 1B have TC designations
from the American College of Surgeons and both serve a similar catchment area. Hospitals 2A and 2B
are somewhat smaller, but they still serve a highly populated catchment area and would be involved in
the response to a multiple-casualty incident occurring within the large suburban area. Because all of the
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
Figure 4: Cumulative distribution of daily bed availability at hospitals used in case study 1 and in
case study 2, for Emergency Department (ED), Intensive Care (ICU), and Medical/Surgical (MS).
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hospitals studied consider their information proprietary, we could access the data only on the condition that
their exact capabilities be disguised. The data span 15 months in 2014 and 2015. Each hospital’s data
contains information about the availability of ED and inpatient beds on a daily basis.
The hospitals used in the case studies do not formally share this information with each other. These
data sets are representative of the kind of data that could reasonably be collected and used by an HCC. The
data are self-reported and include resources that could be mobilized if needed (i.e., surge capacity). Table
3 shows summary statistics. We focus on the ED, ICU, and M/S beds because these are among the most
common healthcare resources, and because both hospitals in each case study have sufficiently many beds in
each of these units that deciding where to send casualties would be a reasonably complex decision problem.
A key concern for HCCs is the quality of the data provided by hospitals. For example, hospitals usually
want to receive patients and therefore may overstate their capacity. Moreover, our data is captured only
once per day, and thus has very coarse time granularity. Despite these identified limitations, our data exhibit
clear day-to-day and inter-hospital variability in the number of available beds and provide sufficient detail
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to construct our high-level measure of healthcare infrastructure response (see Figure 4).
Table 3: Median number of available beds in each resource at hospitals in case study 1 and 2.
Case Study 1 Case Study 2
Resource H1A H1B H2A H2B
Upstream Emergency Department (ED) 30 26 10 9
Downstream
Intensive Care Unit (ICU) 18 0 3 6
Inpatient Medical/Surgical (M/S) 20 0 2 1
Table 4: Median total resources available by day of week.
Case Study 1 Case Study 2
Resource Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri
Upstream ED 55 52 58 57 58 16 18.5 18 19 19.5
Downstream
ICU 20 17 20 20 15 9 4 2.5 3 7
M/S 20 15 13 22 30 11 11 9 8 10
In case study 1, we observe substantially different resource availability between the two hospitals. Hos-
pital 1B is substantially more congested than Hospital 1A (see Table 3). Figure 4 shows the downstream
capacity at Hospital 1A is frequently much higher than at Hospital 1B, although they have similar upstream
(ED) capacity. In case study 2, while the hospitals overall have lower available capacity than in case study
1, available downstream capacity is evenly distributed between hospitals 2A and 2B.
In many healthcare services, the day of the week has a significant impact on availability of services. We
focus on weekdays, when hospitals tend to be the busiest, and for which our data sets were more complete.
While the number of available ED beds does not vary substantially by day of week, we see an impact on
downstream resources, especially M/S (see Table 4). This difference is likely explained by scheduling of
elective surgeries: the bias toward congestion within the inpatient resources later in the week can be caused
by a large number of elective procedures performed early in the week.
5.3 Methodology
As we discussed in Section 4.2, we study three different factors in our experiment, two of which (incident
type and coordination intensity) we vary systematically, and one of which (slack capacity) varies naturally
in the data. For each combination of these factors, we use the formulas from Section 4.1 to compute the
expected PFP completion rate using the empirical bed availability distribution extracted from the hospital
census data described above. However, the computations in Section 4.1 do not provide a way to assess the
variability of the PFP completion rate. Specifically, there are two sources of variability that affect the PFP
completion rate: variability in bed availability (captured in the data) and variability in the actual patient
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flow paths. Therefore, in addition to computing the expected PFP completion rate, we also use Monte
Carlo simulation to determine statistical significance. Specifically, for each combination of the levels, we
perform 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations. In each simulation, the number of available beds in each unit of
each hospital is drawn randomly according to the empirical distributions extracted from the census data, and
each patient’s PFP is sampled according to the probabilities determined from the NTDB. By using common
random numbers, we construct paired T-tests to assess the statistical significance of the change in the PFP
completion rate (and in the case of Hypothesis 4, the difference-in-differences in the PFP completion rate).
6 Results
Using the methodology of Section 5.3, we compute the expected PFP completion rate for four incident sizes
by three injury mechanisms, five levels of coordination intensity, and three levels of slack capacity. UMCI
size categories are defined in Table 5, slack capacity levels were defined based on observing the empirical
bed availability, and mechanisms were associated with PFPs according to the data in Table 2.
Table 5: UMCI size classification.
UMCI size Number of patients
Very Small 2 ≤ m ≤ 10
Small 11 ≤ m ≤ 25
Medium 26 ≤ m ≤ 50
Large 51 ≤ m ≤ 100
In Table 6, we present numerical results for case study 1, for the median number of patients in each
size category. In Table 7, we present the results in the same way for case study 2, excluding large UMCIs
because they always exceed the maximum combined ED capacity of the two hospitals (thus, additional
hospitals would be included in the response in such an incident). Figure 5 summarizes the data differently,
by plotting the PFP completion rate for more granular incident sizes, across different injury mechanisms
and coordination intensities, but aggregating across all levels of slack capacity.
6.1 Impact of Incident Severity, Coordination Intensity, and Slack Capacity
Hypothesis 1 stated that increased incident size and severity would lead to lower PFP completion. Holding
the other independent variables constant at any value, an increase in UMCI size results in a decrease in PFP
completion rate. This trend can be seen in Table 5. The PFP completion rate is highest for firearm injuries,
followed by motor vehicle and general accidents, due to the varying PFPs. Motor vehicle accidents result in
more complex traumatic injuries than firearm incidents, which is reflected in Table 2: patients with motor
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
Table 6: Healthcare infrastructure response performance (PFP completion %) in case study 1.
Mechanism Vehicle Firearm General
Coordination Size Slack Cap. H M L H M L H M L
Level 0
Very Small 80 80 77 87 87 84 77 76 73
Small 72 73 69 82 82 80 68 68 64
Medium 69 68 64 79 78 75 65 63 59
Large 53 49 47 61 57 55 49 45 43
Level 1
Very Small 80 80 77 87 87 84 77 76 73
Small 72 73 72 82 82 81 68 68 67
Medium 69 68 67 79 78 77 65 63 61
Large 53 49 48 61 57 56 49 45 43
Level 2
Very Small 72 73 72 82 82 81 69 70 67
Small 71 71 69 81 81 80 67 66 64
Medium 69 68 67 80 79 78 65 63 61
Large 53 49 47 61 57 55 49 45 43
Level 3
Very Small 98 95 93 99 97 96 98 94 91
Small 97 93 89 98 96 93 95 90 85
Medium 84 80 78 91 88 86 81 75 72
Large 54 50 48 63 59 57 51 46 44
Level 4
Very Small 98 96 94 99 97 96 98 94 92
Small 97 94 91 98 97 95 95 91 87
Medium 93 89 85 97 94 91 90 84 80
Large 69 62 58 74 67 64 65 57 53
vehicle injuries are more likely to require treatment in the inpatient medical/surgical or intensive care units.
Patients with general accidents are more likely to require medical/surgical than either other mechanism,
but are less likely to require the ICU. Patients with firearm injuries are least likely to require an inpatient
resource. Using the Monte Carlo simulation, we tested Hypotheses 1a and 1b and we found support for both
hypotheses for all combinations of coordination and slack capacity (paired T-test, α = 0.01).
Hypothesis 2 stated that an increase in coordination intensity would result in higher PFP completion
rate. Here, the results are slightly more nuanced. If we exclude level 2 from the analysis, Hypothesis 2
is fully supported (see Table 8, which shows statistical significance results for case study 1). Using the
Monte Carlo simulation, we also constructed 95% confidence intervals on the probability that the PFP
completion rate would be (strictly or weakly) improved by increasing the coordination intensity (see Table 9
for the results for case study 1, motor vehicle type). These results show that coordinating based only on ED
information is clearly less effective than coordinating on both ED and inpatient information. Specifically,
level 3 and 4 provide significant improvement in expected PFP completion rate versus levels 0–2, with level
3 providing strict improvement over level 2 in the vast majority of very small, small, and medium size
incidents. This result is of practical importance because EMS providers are primarily concerned with ED
capacity, because their objective is to deliver each patient to the closest appropriate hospital with an available
ED bed. However, assigning patient destinations based only on ED information performs relatively poorly.
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Table 7: Healthcare infrastructure response performance (PFP completion %) in case study 2.
Mechanism Vehicle Firearm General
Coordination Size Slack Cap. H M L H M L H M L
Level 0
Very Small 86 81 76 90 86 82 84 76 70
Small 71 62 59 76 68 66 66 56 52
Medium 43 37 36 47 42 41 39 33 31
Level 1
Very Small 85 79 74 89 84 80 82 74 68
Small 71 63 59 76 69 66 66 56 52
Medium 43 38 36 47 42 41 39 34 31
Level 2
Very Small 85 78 75 90 85 83 82 72 69
Small 71 62 59 78 70 68 66 55 52
Medium 42 36 34 47 41 40 38 31 29
Level 3
Very Small 95 91 87 97 94 92 93 87 83
Small 78 69 65 83 76 73 73 63 58
Medium 44 39 36 48 44 42 41 34 32
Level 4
Very Small 97 93 90 98 95 93 95 89 85
Small 81 73 69 85 79 75 77 66 61
Medium 47 41 39 50 45 43 43 37 34
Table 8: Significance test for H2: increased coordination intensity increases PFP %. The symbol (-)
denotes non-significance, while (*, **, ***) denote significance at the (0.1, 0.01, 0.001) levels.
Mechanism Vehicle Firearm General
Coordination Size Slack Cap. H M L H M L H M L
Level 1 vs Level 0
Very Small* N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Small *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Medium *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Large - - - - - - - - -
Level 2 vs Level 1
Very Small - - - - - - - - -
Small - - - - - - - - -
Medium - - * - - *** - - -
Large *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Level 3 vs Level 2
Very Small *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Small *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Medium *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Large *** *** *** *** *** ** *** *** **
Level 4 vs Level 3
Very Small - ** *** - * *** - ** ***
Small *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Medium *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Large *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
*Note: For Very Small incident size, level 1 and level 0 are identical due to rounding.
In both case studies, we observe that using real-time ED information in level 2 offers surprisingly little
improvement over the baseline level 1, which uses historical (non-real-time) information. In fact, we can find
instances for which level 2 performs worse than level 1, for example, in case study 1, for the motor vehicle
type with high slack capacity, level 2 performs worse than level 1 in more than half of small and medium
sized incidents (at the 95% confidence level; see Table 9). See also the top-left panel of Figure 5, where
the expected value of level 2 is below that of level 1 for some incident sizes. This phenomenon happens
because much of the blocking occurs at the downstream resources, which are often more constrained. Level
2 will send casualties proportionally based on the number of available emergency department beds at the
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Figure 5: PFP completion rate as a function of incident size, mechanism, and coordination policy.
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Note: In coordination intensity levels 0 and 1, the policy is to send a fixed proportion of patients to hospital A. However, due to the
discrete nature of the decision variables, rounding causes a deviation in the actual proportion of patients sent to hospital A, leading
to oscillations in the graph. This phenomenon is particularly evident in small incidents, where the difference of one patient has a
disproportionately large impact on the outcome.
Table 9: 95% confidence interval the probability that increased coordination improves (strictly or
weakly) PFP completion.
Strict Improvement Weak Improvement
Pr{Comparison > Baseline} Pr{Comparison ≥ Baseline}
Comparison Baseline Size \ Slack H M L H M L
Level 1 Level 0
Very Small (0.00, 0.00) (0.00, 0.00) (0.00, 0.00) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00)
Small (0.75, 0.80) (0.64, 0.70) (0.63, 0.68) (1.00, 1.00) (0.98, 1.00) (0.97, 0.99)
Medium (0.83, 0.88) (0.72, 0.77) (0.72, 0.78) (0.94, 0.97) (0.89, 0.93) (0.89, 0.93)
Large (0.03, 0.05) (0.03, 0.06) (0.07, 0.10) (0.55, 0.61) (0.68, 0.74) (0.75, 0.80)
Level 2 Level 1
Very Small (0.03, 0.06) (0.03, 0.06) (0.05, 0.08) (0.77, 0.82) (0.80, 0.85) (0.86, 0.90)
Small (0.14, 0.18) (0.11, 0.15) (0.17, 0.22) (0.39, 0.45) (0.46, 0.52) (0.57, 0.63)
Medium (0.20, 0.25) (0.20, 0.25) (0.28, 0.34) (0.36, 0.42) (0.46, 0.52) (0.58, 0.64)
Large (0.41, 0.47) (0.27, 0.33) (0.21, 0.26) (0.99, 1.00) (0.99, 1.00) (0.99, 1.00)
Level 3 Level 2
Very Small (0.69, 0.75) (0.60, 0.66) (0.58, 0.64) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00)
Small (0.95, 0.97) (0.90, 0.93) (0.85, 0.90) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00)
Medium (0.87, 0.91) (0.78, 0.83) (0.74, 0.79) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00)
Large (0.05, 0.09) (0.03, 0.05) (0.01, 0.02) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00)
Level 4 Level 3
Very Small (0.00, 0.00) (0, 0.01.00) (0.01, 0.03) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00)
Small (0.02, 0.04) (0.05, 0.08) (0.07, 0.10) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00)
Medium (0.83, 0.88) (0.78, 0.83) (0.72, 0.78) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00)
Large (0.94, 0.97) (0.93, 0.95) (0.90, 0.93) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00) (1.00, 1.00)
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time of the incident, which will always perform better than level 1 in terms of ED completion. However,
knowing nothing about inpatient availability, a policy that is based solely on real-time ED bed availability
can backfire if there are few or no inpatient resources available at the hospital with more available ED beds.
In our data for case study 1, it was often the case that hospital B had very little inpatient capacity (while
hospital A had sufficient inpatient capacity) even though both hospitals had similar ED bed availability.
If we care about the ability to treat the patient successfully all the way from the incident to the resulting
inpatient hospitalization, coordinating on ED information is insufficient, even in real time. This result
highlights the importance of a system perspective that includes all aspects of a patient’s treatment.
Table 10: Significance test for H3: increased slack capacity increases PFP %. The symbol (-) denotes
non-significance, while (*, **, ***) denote significance at the 0.1, 0.01, and 0.001 levels respectively.
Mechanism Vehicle Firearm General
Coordination Size Slack Cap. H vs M M vs L H vs M M vs L H vs M M vs L
Level 0
Very Small * *** - *** ** ***
Small - *** - *** - ***
Medium *** *** *** *** *** ***
Large *** *** *** *** *** ***
Level 1
Very Small * *** - *** ** ***
Small *** *** * *** *** ***
Medium *** *** *** *** *** ***
Large *** *** *** *** *** ***
Level 2
Very Small - *** - *** - ***
Small - *** - *** *** ***
Medium *** *** *** *** *** ***
Large *** *** *** *** *** ***
Level 3
Very Small *** *** *** *** *** ***
Small *** *** *** *** *** ***
Medium *** *** *** *** *** ***
Large *** *** *** *** *** ***
Level 4
Very Small *** *** *** *** *** ***
Small *** *** *** *** *** ***
Medium *** *** *** *** *** ***
Large *** *** *** *** *** ***
Due to predictable variability in bed availability by day of week, we were able to study the system under
different levels of slack capacity, confirming that when more slack capacity is available, system performance
is generally better. Table 10 shows statistical significance for the hypothesis that increasing slack capacity
leads to increased PFP completion. The difference is significant except when incident sizes are very small
or small and slack capacity is medium (in which case there is already enough slack capacity that increasing
it to high does not improve the outcome). In practical terms, this means that the healthcare infrastructure is
more vulnerable in the middle of the week when slack capacity is low. We discuss the practical implications
of predictable variability in more detail in Section 6.3.3.
To summarize, the results of the case studies broadly support Hypotheses 1(a-b), 2 (with the excep-
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tion of level 2), and 3(a); namely, the PFP completion rate decreases in UMCI severity, and increases in
coordination intensity and slack capacity.
6.2 Interaction Effects
Perhaps the result that is most relevant to HCCs is the interaction between UMCI size and the positive
effect of coordination intensity on PFP completion rate. Hypothesis 4 states that increasing coordination
will have a smaller positive impact on PFP completion rate for larger incidents. We test this hypothesis
using the results of the Monte Carlo simulation by means of a paired T-test for the difference-in-differences.
Specifically, for each coordination intensity level, we compute the difference in the improvement over the
baseline between successive incident sizes. The results of this significance test for case study 1 are shown
in Table 11. Again, if we exclude Level 2, Hypothesis 4 is fully supported: as incidents get larger, there
is a significant decrease in the improvement due to coordination. The decrease in effect of coordination
intensity is statistically significant for levels 3 and 4, for medium and large incidents, when level 1 is used
as a baseline. In large incidents, each hospital reaches its own capacity under any reasonable transportation
policy, and improvement in PFP completion can only be obtained by pooling inpatient resources (as in
coordination intensity level 4). Visually, we can see this result by examining Figure 5 and Table 6: when the
incident size is large, the differences between coordination levels is comparatively small.
Once again, level 2 proves to be an exception. This can be seen most clearly in Figure 5, where level
2 outperforms level 1 only when the incident size is medium. This result can be explained by thinking
about the benefits provided by level 2 coordination, namely real-time ED capacity information. On the
one hand, real-time ED capacity information does not provide much of a benefit when the incident size is
sufficiently small, because the EDs in both case studies almost always had enough capacity to take on a few
patients—adding information does not change this. On the other hand, when the incident size is larger, the
system becomes more constrained, with the most constrained resources being inpatient services. Level 2
coordination does not provide information about those resources, and hence performs poorly.
The interaction effect highlights the large benefit offered by real-time information sharing for very small
and small incidents–as much as 20 percentage points for the motor vehicle mechanism in case study 1.
This result is important because smaller incidents occur more frequently, underscoring the potential impact
of information collection and dissemination by HCCs on a daily basis, rather than just in large disaster
situations. This result runs somewhat counter to the typical practice of MAC in communities lacking an
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Table 11: Significance test for H4: larger incident size reduces the improvement due to coordination.
(-) denotes non-significance, and (*, **, ***) denote significance at the (0.1, 0.01, 0.001) levels.
Mechanism Vehicle Firearm General
Comparison level Size Slack Cap. H M L H M L H M L
Level 2 (vs Level 1)
Very Small vs Small *** *** ** *** *** * *** *** **
Small vs Medium - - - - - - - - -
Medium vs Large - - - - - - - - -
Level 3 (vs Level 1)
Very Small vs Small - - * - * * - ** ***
Small vs Medium *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Medium vs Large *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Level 4 (vs Level 1)
Very Small vs Small - - - - - * - - *
Small vs Medium - - - - - - ** * ***
Medium vs Large *** *** *** - *** *** *** *** ***
HCC, such as opening a command center only after a large disaster.
Turning to Hypothesis 5, which postulates that greater inter-hospital variability in slack capacity in-
creases the positive effect of coordination intensity on PFP completion rate, we find supporting evidence
from comparing the two case studies. Figure 4 shows that case study 1 has asymmetric inpatient slack
capacity: bed availability is heavily concentrated at hospital 1. On the other hand, case study 2 has more
evenly distributed inpatient slack capacity. We find that the positive effect of coordination intensity is more
than twice as large in the asymmetric case as in the evenly distributed case (compare the upper and lower
panels in Figure 5, being careful to note differences in scale on both the x and y axes).
Because inter-hospital variability in capacity does not naturally vary within each case study, we con-
ducted a counterfactual analysis with the data of case study 1 to assess the statistical significance of H5
using Monte Carlo simulation. Specifically, we repeated the Monte Carlo simulation for case study 1 and
artificially reduced the inter-hospital variability in ICU bed availability by taking the total ICU availability
for each simulation and dividing it evenly between the two hospitals. Doing so results in higher PFP com-
pletion rate and an increased effect of coordination intensity on PFP completion rate (at the 0.01 level for all
other combinations of the other factors), providing further support for Hypothesis 3(b) and Hypothesis 5.
6.3 Practical Applications
In this section, we demonstrate three practical applications for our model using the results of the experiment
on case study 1.
6.3.1 Stress test for healthcare infrastructure vulnerability.
One use for our model is to assess the vulnerability of a healthcare infrastructure. We now demonstrate a
way to make the results accessible for practitioners. We associate a healthcare infrastructure stress level
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with each of the four UMCI sizes in Table 5. We introduce a user-defined service level, denoted by SL,
which is the is the minimum acceptable PFP completion rate, and we determine the largest incident size m
for which the PFP completion rate is at least SL. If m is large [medium, small, very small], we say the
healthcare infrastructure stress level is minimal [low, medium, high].
Table 12: Care infrastructure vulnerability: results of stress test on case study 1.
Vehicle Firearm General
SL Coordination M T W R F M T W R F M T W R F
0.75 Level 0      # # # # −      
0.75 Level 1      # # # − −      
0.75 Level 2      − # # − −      
0.75 Level 3 # # # # # − − − − − # # # # #
0.75 Level 4 − − − − − − − − − − − # # − −
M T W R F M T W R F M T W R F
0.85 Level 0                
0.85 Level 1                
0.85 Level 2                
0.85 Level 3 # # # # # # # # # # # G# G# # #
0.85 Level 4 # # # # − − − − − − # G# # # #
M T W R F M T W R F M T W R F
0.95 Level 0                
0.95 Level 1                
0.95 Level 2                
0.95 Level 3    G# G# G#  G# # #     G#
0.95 Level 4 G#   G# # # G# G# # #     G#
Key: − minimal stress, # low stress, G# moderate stress,  high stress.
Results of the stress test for case study 1 are presented in Table 12 for three different values of SL. The
stress test highlights many of the results we discussed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. For example, we observe
higher stress levels in the middle of the week, even with high coordination intensity, due to the predictable
variability in slack capacity. Since midweek congestion is driven by hospital operational policies, this result
highlights a further opportunity to involve hospitals in incident response.
The healthcare infrastructure stress test and the presentation of the data in the format of Table 12 provides
several benefits for managers. First, it allows them to define a specific target service level that corresponds
to an organizational goal. Second, it provides a quick comparison across different mechanisms and days of
the week. Finally, it enables the identification of weaknesses through quick visual inspection.
6.3.2 Decision support for hospital inclusion in response.
One strong application for our model is to support the hospital inclusion decision. In a UMCI, it is not
always immediately clear which hospital(s) (or how many hospitals) should be involved in the response.
Calculating the PFP completion rate for different hospitals, or for different combinations of hospitals, can
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support this decision. For example, in case study 1, it is clear from Figure 4 that hospital B is often close to
capacity in its inpatient services. Therefore, responders might wonder whether it is worthwhile to include
hospital B at all. Moreover, this decision depends on the level of coordination intensity.
Figure 6: PFP completion rate as a function of incident size, disaster type, and coordination policy.
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We calculated the expected PFP completion rate for hospital A alone and compared it with the PFP
completion rate for the network of two hospitals given in Table 6 and Figure 5. The results are shown in
Figure 6. We see that at level 3 (real-time ED plus inpatient information) , it is always beneficial to include
hospital B, although the benefit is minimal when the incident size is Very Small. However, if coordination
is limited to level 2 (real-time ED information), it is better to use hospital A alone when the incident size
is less than about 40 patients. Once the incident size is large enough, hospital B should be included even if
limited coordination is available. This application can be repeated for different hospitals and different size
networks. For instance, in case study 1, once the incident size is large enough that all the coordination levels
converge (in Figure 5), it would probably be worthwhile to include a third hospital, even though we did not
have sufficient data to explore this possibility.
6.3.3 Information exposes the hidden problem of variable hospital workloads
The consideration of slack capacity in Hypothesis 4 is particularly relevant to the practical issues facing
urban healthcare infrastructures because slack capacity in hospital inpatient units varies significantly by day
of the week. This predictable variability in workloads is a nearly ubiquitous feature of hospital services,
and is often a result of scheduling practices that concentrate elective procedures on certain days of the week
(see, e.g., Helm and Van Oyen 2014).
Our results show that increased coordination intensity does not mitigate the impact of predictable vari-
ability. In fact, it intensifies it (see Figure 7). The relative effect of workload variability increases with more
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Figure 7: PFP completion rate by UMCI size and day of week (Motor Vehicle incident type).
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Table 13: Percent change in coefficient of variation (CV) of PFP completion across days of the week
(case study 1, motor vehicle and firearm mechanisms).
Motor Vehicle Firearm
Very Small Small Medium Large Very Small Small Medium Large
Level 3 vs Level 0 21% 55% 24% 1% 14% 46% 9% 0%
Level 4 vs Level 0 5% 30% 24% 37% -4% 19% 11% 32%
information and better coordination, revealing that the system is more vulnerable to resource constraints
caused by unbalanced hospital workloads. This result makes sense because resources (and in particular,
downstream resources) are more highly utilized when care is coordinated.
Table 13 shows the percent increase in the coefficient of variation (cv) of PFP completion rate across days
of the week caused by implementing a high level of coordination intensity. Specifically, level 3 coordination
intensity can result in PFP completion rates that are as much as 55% more variable than the baseline.
The operational explanation for this phenomenon is that the system suffers from serious capacity prob-
lems on certain days of the week (most notably Tuesday and Wednesday), but such capacities are less likely
to be reached in the uncoordinated case, due to patient maldistribution that occurs because of the lack of
information. We argue that predictable variability in workloads creates unnecessarily high levels of stress on
days when inpatient resources are highly utilized. As providers and HCCs improve operational response to
incidents by increasing coordination and information sharing, other operational issues, namely predictable
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midweek capacity limitations, will be exposed. This result highlights the importance of continuous moni-
toring and evaluation of performance under increasing coordination.
There is a clear interaction between predictable and random variability, the latter of which is increased
when there is more uncertainty about the type of resources a patient will need. Comparing the results for
motor vehicle mechanism to firearm mechanism in Table 13, we see that the negative effect of predictable
variability is driven by the availability of inpatient resources, because the increase is smaller for the firearm
mechanism, which is less likely to require inpatient resources.
In addition to concerns about temporal variability, policy makers should understand how regulations
affect inter-hospital variability in resource availability, which was a driver in healthcare infrastructure re-
sponse in our study. For example, some jurisdictions require justification (e.g., a Certificate of Need) before
expanding the physical space in a hospital, which limits the ability of hospitals to adjust capacity of inpatient
services and could therefore lead to increased inter-hospital variability in resource utilization.
7 Implications for Practice and Public Policy
Public policy affects operational decisions made by organizations, and in turn context-specific observations
about operational problems inform public policy (Joglekar et al., 2016). We study healthcare coalitions
(HCCs), which are organizations created by public policy. In turn, the results of this study should inform
policy makers interested in improving emergency response.
MAC should be included in urban HCC. HCCs were created with the goal of improving disaster re-
sponse, but each HCC is established by members in a local or regional area, and so HCCs vary in terms
of structure and function (see Section 3.1). Specifically, some HCCs include multi-agency coordination
(MAC) as a core functionality and others do not. Our study supports the conclusion that MAC is valuable
in an UMCI; furthermore, higher levels of coordination can only be provided by involving a HCC. Coordi-
nation intensity levels 0 and 1 can definitely be achieved by EMS acting alone, while levels 3 and 4 require
hospital involvement, in turn making it unlikely that they can be implemented without participation of an
HCC. The feasibility of level 2 coordination intensity without an HCC is debatable, but we found that coor-
dinating based on ED information alone (i.e., level 2) provides a limited benefit compared to levels 3 and 4.
Therefore, we recommend that in an urban setting, MAC should be a core functionality of an HCC.
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MAC should be expanded to cover small incidents. In large incidents (and for case study 2, medium
incidents), the improvement due to information sharing is limited. This occurs because when the entire
system is overwhelmed, the sheer number of patients ensures that both hospital EDs will be fully utilized.
Once the upstream resources reach their capacity, the resulting expected usage of downstream resources is
the same for all coordination intensities. In contrast, when a metropolitan area experiences inter-hospital
variability in resource availability, coordination through information sharing can provide a surprisingly large
benefit even in very small incidents (those with only a few patients).
We emphasize that this conclusion is a potential new value proposition for HCCs: although these orga-
nizations were initially conceived to prepare for large disasters, they can have a substantial benefit in more
routine incidents, suggesting that communities should find ways to more closely integrate HCCs into daily
emergency response.
HCCs should collect information about inpatient resources. In Sec. 6.1 we observe several results that
suggest that bed availability at downstream resources (inpatient medical/surgical and intensive care units)
are the primary drivers of PFP completion in a metropolitan area where those resources are congested.
We find that real-time information about ED bed availability had disappointingly poor performance
compared with sharing only historical mean bed availability at the ED in both case studies (see Figure 5).
The relatively small benefit of real-time ED capacity information versus historical information is not because
the information itself is not valuable, but rather because the patterns of congestion in hospitals tend to create
bottlenecks in highly-utilized inpatient resources, such as the ICU. In both of our case studies, inpatient
resources were more limited than ED resources. Unlike in studies that look at only one hospital, however,
we find the presence of high inter-hospital variability in inpatient resource availability makes information
about those resources much more valuable. For example, in the data for case study 1, we can find days
where hospital A has several ICU beds available, while hospital B has none, and we can also find days where
hospital A has none and hospital B has several. This inter-hospital variability makes it difficult to predict
which hospital is going to have available ICU beds without real-time information. Moreover, because ICU
beds are usually extremely limited, the value of knowing which hospital has available ICU beds is large.
Recall from Section 2.2 that placing MAC functionality within an HCC enables hospitals to participate
actively in coordination. Our results clearly show that MAC should incorporate information about down-
stream resources in addition to information about ED bed capacity. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to
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collect this information in a useful way without the active participation of hospitals. Therefore, our results
suggest there is a clear benefit if the MAC function is assigned to an HCC, or if HCCs are a major participant
in MAC, because doing so allows downstream information to be leveraged.
Information sharing is insufficient in large incidents. In a completely integrated system, patients who
receive upstream care at one hospital can move to a downstream resource at the other hospital. Inter-hospital
flow of trauma patients would be rare in practice for both medical and operational reasons, but it might occur
if both hospitals are part of the same healthcare delivery network, or if the HCC is given broad latitude to
coordinate inter-hospital transfers due to the scale of the emergency. We argue that coordination intensity
level 4 is more representative of a theoretical maximum system performance than a realistically achievable
outcome in most instances, but this option shows that it is possible to make additional improvements using
an extreme mechanism (hospital-to-hospital transfers precipitated only by capacity constraints). In a very
large incident, mobilizing this more expansive level of coordination may be justified.
Our observations about the power and limitations of information sharing lead us to two conclusions
about coordination in incident response. For small incidents, most of the benefit can be achieved through
information sharing, which is relatively inexpensive (in terms of both monetary cost and palatability to com-
peting organizations). On the other hand, for very large incidents, only full integration of care resources
provides much improvement over any level of information sharing. During routine operations, most com-
peting hospitals would be unwilling to participate in full care integration. However, large incidents are
comparatively rare, suggesting that this extreme measure need not be employed frequently.
Increasing coordination provides substantial value for marginal cost. Our results show that HCCs can
provide value by providing the MAC function, expanding this function to include smaller, non-disaster-
type, incidents (e.g., UMCIs), and expanding information collection and dissemination to include data on
inpatient capacities. Before implementing these policy suggestions, HCCs and policy makers must consider
the effectiveness of these measures compared to the marginal cost of implementation. This value becomes
apparent considering the fact that most of the costs of running an HCC are sunk and smaller incidents occur
more frequently than large disasters.
Recall from Section 3.1 that HCCs were originally funded to improve disaster preparedness and re-
sponse. As such, they already have much of the infrastructure required for MAC. For example, many HCCs
have invested in information systems, data collection and monitoring capability, and communication equip-
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ment and processes. See Table 1, in which all of the example HCCs have some kind of technology, staff or
facilities dedicated to coordination. Given that most HCCs already have invested in coordination capabil-
ities, extending their reach to cover smaller incidents (that occur more frequently) would require minimal
variable costs. In fact, some HCCs already have a full-time coordinator (for example, MESH Coalition; see
Table 1). Those that do not may need to add such a staff position to monitor and disseminate relevant data
more actively. We estimate this position would be at most one full-time equivalent, and therefore a relatively
small portion of the HCC’s total budget.
Expanding the MAC function to include smaller incidents would result in a much higher utilization of
the HCC’s coordination capability. Data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2008)
show that between 2005 and 2007 (the most recent years for which this data is available), over half a million
motor vehicle crashes in resulted in two or more casualties transported to hospitals (see Table 14). We
searched the EM-DAT international disaster database (Guha-Sapir et al., 2017) over the same time period
and geographic area, which returned just 18 disasters with patient injuries (see Table 15). Although neither
of these databases covers all incidents that would meet the definition of UMCI, the difference in scale
demonstrates that there is tremendous opportunity for increasing the utilization of coordination capabilities
that already exist in many HCCs. Expanding coordination to cover smaller incidents would allow HCCs
to provide more “bang for the buck” by amortizing their high fixed costs over more events. Moreover,
the increased use of these capabilities provides more opportunities to practice coordinating, potentially
providing locality-specific lessons that can be applied in the event that a large disaster strikes.
Table 14: Frequency of motor vehicle collisions with multiple patient transports in the United States
(2005-2007) (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2008).
UMCI Size Number of incidents Number of patients
Very Small (2 ≤ m ≤ 10) 552,387 1,399,981
Small (11 ≤ m ≤ 25) 1,272 17,846
Table 15: Frequency of disasters in the United States (2005-2007) (Guha-Sapir et al., 2017).
UMCI Size Number of incidents Number of patients
Very Small (2 ≤ m ≤ 10) 2 16
Small (11 ≤ m ≤ 25) 6 90
Medium (26 ≤ m ≤ 50) 2 71
Large (51 ≤ m ≤ 100) 4 324
Extra Large (101 ≤ m) 6 1,402
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8 Limitations and Future Work
There are some limitations to our model. Our data was not granular enough to obtain estimates for time
intervals smaller than one day. Our model also was not designed to incorporate triage or mortality: we
consider only incidents where the number of casualties is not so large that all hospitals in the area will be
overwhelmed, but integrating triage and hospital selection is a clear avenue for future research. On the
other hand, our model is tailored to the type of data that HCCs can obtain from their members. HCCs
that have data about hospital census can use the model to study their healthcare infrastructure vulnerability
and to conduct scenario-based stress tests, examine the decision of hospital inclusion, and understand how
predictable variability affects incident response. In particular, understanding how predictable variability in
hospital workloads impacts community capacity is deserving of further study.
As we discussed in Section 3.3, our model focuses on the role an HCC can play in coordinating mul-
tiple autonomous entities, as opposed to the operations of EMS. Whereas most models of EMS operations
consider a response-time objective, we consider an objective that maximizes the probability a patient will
be able to access the right kind of hospital resources, which is specific to the UMCI setting.
We did not consider the effect that our patient distribution policies would have on patients already in
the hospital. However, prior research has shown that hospital overcrowding (i.e., waiting patients) has an
effect on service of existing patients, both in the ED (Batt and Terwiesch, 2016) and in the ICU (KC and
Terwiesch, 2012). Because coordination improves usage of existing beds, it could reduce hospital congestion
and consequently reduce the negative externalities imposed by the UMCI on existing hospital patients.
In our discussions with the informants who participated in our study, one of the key challenges in incident
response is patient tracking. Our work highlights the importance of improving patient tracking, since using
information about downstream resources requires understanding of patient flow pathways. Because detailed
information about patient flow pathways in the studied metropolitan areas was not available, we used a
national survey to estimate the first downstream resource used. Ideally, our model would be expanded to
consider subsequent downstream resources, and to tailor patient flow pathways to a specific metropolitan
area using granular patient-level data. Although challenging in practice, collecting data about PFPs is a
potential future role of HCCs that should be explored.
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9 Conclusion
In contrast to the original impetus for HCCs, which was the desire on the part of communities to prepare
for large disasters, we identify coordination of autonomous healthcare entities in smaller, more frequent
incidents as a clear value proposition. We demonstrate these results using actual bed availability data from
one urban and one suburban area. To our knowledge, our model is the first to incorporate downstream care
resources (such as the intensive care unit) in decision-making about casualty distribution, which is also a
sharp departure from the common EMS practice of considering only ED availability when making trans-
portation decisions. We show that this distinction is very important: in our result, sharing ED information
provided disappointingly little benefit compared to sharing downstream resource information.
The US healthcare system is characterized by decentralized control of healthcare infrastructure, with
some hospitals having a profit-seeking motive. In the absence of an HCC, there is little incentive for hospitals
to engage in coordination with their competitors. In this sense, the US system is a “worst-case” scenario for
coordination. Coordination would likely be easier to achieve in a system where all hospitals are operated
by the same entity (e.g., in the UK). In the US, HCCs make coordination possible because when the HCC
provides MAC functionality, no hospital would be better off by leaving the coalition as they would be less
involved in UMCI response.
HCCs are growing and diverse organizations, and because of their relative novelty there is not a pro-
totypical funding and operational model. HCCs also rely on hospitals and other community healthcare
providers to be willing participants, and they are subject to network effects, particularly if communities
desire an HCC to provide MAC functionality. Therefore, a pressing concern is determining an appropriate
mix of services for an HCC to provide in any given community in order to be sustainable. Because policy
makers are intimately involved in funding HCCs in the US, they should consider providing incentives to
autonomous healthcare entities to participate in data collection efforts and in coordinative activities.
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Figure 8: Temporal sequence of UMCI response activities, participants, and roles.
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